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I. Statement of the Case. 
This case involves the enforcement of a personal guaranty of a commercial loan, 
and the interpretation of the language in the guaranty agreement defining the scope of the 
guaranty obligation. 
II. Course of Proceedings Below. 
PlaintifflRespondent Idaho Trust Bank ("ITB") filed its Verified Complaint 
against Defendant! Appellant Christian on May 13, 2011. On August 5, 2011, ITB filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. On August 18, 2011, Christian filed his opposition to ITB's motion. 
On September 13, 2011, Christian filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment. In response to 
Christian's opposition, ITB withdrew a portion of its motion, converting it to a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Oral argument on both motions was heard on December 22,2011. Ruling 
from the bench, the District Court granted ITB's motion and denied Christian's motion. The 
Court issued a written order to the same effect on January 11, 2012. Christian moved for 
reconsideration on January 9, 2011, which motion the District Court denied by its order dated 
February 8, 2012. Final judgment was entered on March 7, 2012. Christian filed his Notice of 
Appeal on March 15,2012. 
III. Facts. 
In December 2006, ITB made a construction loan to Trinity Investments, LLC 
("Trinity"), evidenced by a promissory note ("the Note") and secured by a deed of trust ("the 
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Deed of Trust") against real property in Garden City, Idaho ultimately developed into twenty-
three townhouse units. CR 11, 199. 
In connection with the loan, Christian executed a Commercial Guaranty in favor 
of Plaintiff ("the Guaranty Agreement" or "the Agreement"). CR 14. In its Complaint and its 
own motion for summary judgment, ITB asserted that the "Note was personally guaranteed by 
Defendant" (CR 6), but this does not accurately describe the terms of the Guaranty Agreement. 
The Agreement contains the following relevant language: 
1. It provides that the guarantor "guarantees the full and punctual payment and satisfaction 
of the Indebtedness of Borrower to Lender[.]" Thus, what is guaranteed is not "the Note" 
but the "Indebtedness." 
2. "Indebtedness" is a capitalized and defined term in the Guaranty Agreement. The 
Agreement states: 
The word 'Indebtedness' as used in this Guaranty means all of 
the principal amount outstanding from time to time and at anyone 
or more times, accrued unpaid interest thereon and all collection 
costs and legal expenses related thereto permitted by law, 
reasonable attorneys' fees, arising from any and all debts, 
liabilities of every nature or form, now existing or hereafter arising 
or acquired, that Borrower individually or collectively or 
interchangeably with others, owes or will owe to Lender. 
CR 14. Thus, the scope of the guaranty obligation is expressly defined as the amounts "that 
Borrower ... owes or will owe to Lender." The section of the Guaranty Agreement defining 
"Indebtedness" refers to the definition as a "limitation on liability." Id. Following the sentence 
defining "Indebtedness," the Agreement then provides: 
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Id. 
Indebtedness includes, without limitation, loans, advances, debts, 
overdraft indebtedness, credit card indebtedness, lease obligations, 
other obligations, and liabilities of Borrower, and any present and 
future judgments against Borrower, future advances, loans or 
transactions that renew, extend, modifY, refinance, consolidate or 
substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether: 
voluntarily or involuntarily incurred; due or to become due by their 
terms or acceleration; absolute or contingent; liquidated or 
unliquidated; determined or undetermined; direct or indirect; 
primary or secondary in nature or arising from a guaranty or 
surety; secured or unsecured; joint or several or joint and several; 
evidenced by a negotiable or non negotiable instrument or writing; 
originated by Lender or another or others; barred or unenforceable 
against Borrower for any reason whatsoever; for any transactions 
that may be voidable for any reason (such as infancy, insanity, 
ultra vires or otherwise); and originated then reduced or 
extinguished and then afterwards increased or reinstated. 
On February 4, 2010, ITB obtained an Order Appointing Receiver for Trinity. 
The order expressly authorized the receiver to market and to sell the real property which was the 
collateral for the Loan. CR 207. The receiver was authorized to sell any of the townhouse units 
without further court approval, if the sales price of a unit was at least 80% of its appraised value. 
CR 212-213. The receiver's powers were sought by ITB. CR 217. Christian was not a party to 
the receivership proceedings. Id. Pursuant to the Order Appointing Receiver sought and 
obtained by ITB, the receiver marketed and sold all of the remaining townhouse units owned by 
Trinity. CR 331. None of the sales occurred by foreclosure pursuant to the power of sale 
contained in the Deed of Trust. ITB did not seek or obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity. 
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In this action, ITB moved for summary judgment to enforce the Guaranty 
Agreement against Christian. CR 71. Christian filed his opposition to ITB's motion for 
summary judgment, and filed his own motion for summary judgment. CR 194. The basis of 
Christian's motion was that: (1) the Guaranty Agreement's primary definition of the guaranteed 
"Indebtedness," including amounts the borrower "owes or will owe," limited his guaranty 
obligation; (2) once ITB disposed of the collateral by selling it through a receivership and 
thereby lost the ability to obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity, Trinity no longer "owed" 
any amount to ITB; and (3) as a result no further "Indebtedness" existed to be guaranteed under 
the Guaranty Agreement. Christian asserted that other terms in the Guaranty Agreement 
purporting to expand the guaranty obligation beyond amounts the borrower "owes or will owe" 
to ITB necessarily read the primary definition of "Indebtedness" - the phrase "owes or will 
owe" -- out of the Agreement, rendering it ambiguous, and such ambiguity must be construed 
against the lender and drafter, ITB. CR 232-342. 
At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court, commenting from the bench, concluded that the Guaranty Agreement was unambiguous, 
and unlimited. The District Court did not issue a written order explaining its ruling. In the 
written order granting ITB's motion and denying Christian's motion, the District COUli referred 
the parties to its bench comments during the hearing on the parties' cross-motions. CR 374. 
However, it necessarily concluded that: (a) despite the definition of the guaranteed 
"Indebtedness" as amounts the borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB, the guaranty obligation was 
unambiguously unconditional as to any amount borrowed and unpaid, irrespective of whether the 
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borrower stilled "owes" any amount to ITB; and (b) the term "owes" did not carry its ordinary 
and plain meaning of "subject to an enforceable obligation to repay," but unambiguously meant 
borrowed and unpaid, even if the borrower was no longer legally obligated to repay an amount as 
a result of ITB' s own actions in disposing of the collateral. 
The District Court's reasoning behind those conclusions, to the extent it can be 
divined, is reflected in the following comments. First, the Court asserted that Christian's 
argument effectively read out of the Agreement the second part of the definition of 
"Indebtedness" (which, according to the Court, made the guaranty obligation unconditional): 
THE COURT: And where is it - where is owes defined in? 
MR. MARCUS: Owes is not defined in the guaranty agreement, 
but it has been defined by the courts in the numerous cases that 
we've cited. It has a plain meaning and most of the decisions just 
cite Webster's dictionary. But there are numerous decisions that 
interpret what - what the tenn owes means, the legal interpretation 
of it. 
And I think it's pretty clear. I think what owes means is pretty 
clear. There's a legally enforceable obligation. 
THE COURT: So, in other words, the language that defines 
Indebtedness has no meaning? 
MR. MARCUS: Now you're talking about the second sentence 
under the paragraph Indebtedness? 
THE COURT: Yes. It has no meaning[.] 
Tr, p. 28, 1. 14 - p. 29, 1. 5. In fact, the District Court itself apparently thought that the word 
"owes" in the definition of "Indebtedness" was meaningless and had no effect on other parts of 
the Agreement: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 5 
THE COURT: Well- you know, the problem is that you're trying 
to take one word, owes, and create this ambiguity that I don't think 
exists and you're ignoring all of the other language that 
specifically includes waivers arising from deficiencies, arising 
from any other impairment, arising - for example, that are 
extinguished, that - I just - I think - you're making a lot about 
owes, but I don't think you've read - you haven't read the whole 
contract in the context of the contract. 
MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, if you interpret it that way, at most it 
creates a conflict with the specific definition of Indebtedness. 
THE COURT: Well, you're assuming that it's ambiguous and I'm 
not so sure that I would find it to be ambiguous -
MR. MARCUS: No-
THE COURT: -- because I think you're reading a lot into that 
word that I don't think exists. 
MR. MARCUS: Into Indebtedness? 
THE COURT: The word owes. 
MR. MARCUS: The word owes? 
THE COURT: I don't think it changes anything. 
Tr., p. 42, 1. _- p. 43, 1. 21. 
MR. MARCUS: Well, Your Honor, I agree that the whole contract 
should be read, but it is possible to read the whole contract and -
and reach the conclusion that, well, what you've got are two 
provisions that conflict with each other. 
THE COURT: But there is no conflict. This makes it clear there 
is no conflict. 
MR. MARCUS: Well, it's - there's no conflict if you ignore the 
meaning of owes. 
THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. The meaning of owes, you're 
simply wrong. The cases that you cite to are distinguishable from 
what we have here. Everything that we look at depends on what 
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the contract says and for you to - for the definition of owes to be 
what you say it is, that provision I read would have no meaning. 
MR. MARCUS: Does the provision that you just read to me 
define the term owes? 
THE COURT: It doesn't have to define the term owes. I'm 
simply telling you I don't think that your argument makes sense. 
Tr., p. 46, 1. 7 - p. 47, 1. 3. 
Eventually, the District Court revealed that, in its view, the intent and purpose of 
any guaranty was to ensure that the lender is paid, without regard to the actual definition of the 
guaranty obligation. In doing so the Court essentially cast aside any pretense of actually reading 
and interpreting the definition ofthe guaranty obligation in the agreement before it. It stated: 
I'm sorry, the borrower had - has an indebtedness. Whether they 
can collect against the bOlTower is a different issue. And a 
guaranty - the purpose -- this is the reason that I, for one, would 
never sign a personal guaranty. The purpose of a personal 
guaranty is to insure that the lender is paid in the event that the 
borrower can't pay for whatever reason. It doesn't make any 
difference what the reason is that the debtor can't pay. That's - the 
guarantor has a separate contract. 
And I do agree with you, these underlying agreements that exist 
are really somewhat ilTelevant. But the fact of the matter is that 
the purpose behind the guaranty is to do exactly what's happening 
here. 
Tr., p. 48, 1. 24 -- p. 49, 1. 14. In other words, apparently, in the District Court's 
view it is impossible for a guaranty agreement ever to be ambiguous, because the underlying 
general purpose and intent of such an agreement is that the lender will always be able to recover 
under any circumstances. 
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The Court then commented that it had seen many guaranty agreements in the 
previous year that were "almost word for word what this one is." The relevance of this was not 
explained. It observed that Christian's argument was "novel." The relevance of this also was 
not explained. In summarizing its decision the Court seems to have assumed, generally, that 
commercial guaranty agreement are "all encompassing" and have no limits (despite the fact that 
the Agreement here refers to its own definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness" as a "limitation 
on liability"): 
I think the lenders have gotten very good - and I'm just going to 
make a general comment before I look at this language - have 
gotten very good at writing these guarantees to make them as all 
encompassing as possible. The courts have enforced that. 
In this case the guaranty provides, and I don't think there's any 
argument about this language. The language that's at issue has to 
do with what's an Indebtedness. I'm going to talk about that. But 
here it's very clear that in looking at the language of the guaranty 
that it's an unconditional guaranty and that there is no requirement 
that the lender proceed against the collateral or proceed against the 
debtor before proceeding against the guarantor. 
So the issue here - and I will note that the Court of Appeals has 
gone so far as to say that a - when the guaranty is unconditional, 
the guarantor cannot imply limitations on the lender's right to 
recover. It's the plain and unambiguous terms that dictate the 
intent of the parties and the obligations. 
So the definition of the Indebtedness - and as I have said, I think 
the parties have focused only on the definition of Indebtedness, but 
I do believe that to the extent that Mr. Christian is arguing that 
somehow the word owes is ambiguous - and as I indicated to you, 
Mr. Marcus, I've read those cases and I don't believe that they 
stand for the proposition that the word owes has the meaning that 
you suggest in the - as long as it's here in the presence of the 
language that appears here. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 8 
And I threw out a couple of examples, but I could probablY throw 
out quite a few more because I think when you read the totality of 
this guaranty, they make it clear that it is not the liability of the -
the present liability of the debtor that determines whether the 
guarantor is still liable. It's not the present liability. It refers to -
that the guarantor is waiving some of these rights and defenses. 
The - the guarantor's waiving a defense based on the anti-
deficiency law. And of course, there's case law that says the anti-
deficiency law does not extend to the guarantor. It is there only for 
the debtor. And, as I pointed out, I think it's important to show 
that in - in - in the - if there is, in fact, a bankruptcy and there's a 
full discharge of the debtor, this language makes it clear that the 
indebtedness shall be considered unpaid for the purposes of the 
enforcement of the guaranty. 
And if you go back to the term Indebtedness, it is extreme - it is an 
extremely broad definition of Indebtedness and includes more than 
just loans. It has a number of things that it covers. And I don't 
want to go through and read them because they've already -
people have already read them. 
But it also makes clear that even if - even if it's barred or 
unenforceable against the borrower for any reason whatsoever, it 
still survives. If there's any transactions that could be voidable, 
normally those things, and they give examples like infancy, 
insanity, ultra-vires or otherwise, even if that were to occur, even if 
the debtor would still have those defenses, the guarantor would 
still be - it would still be considered an Indebtedness for the 
purpose of this guaranty and that's what I think that waiver 
language deals with. 
So when I look at this, it appears to me that this is an extremely 
broad guaranty and I don't find a basis upon which the guarantor 
can escape liability. 
* * * * 
So I find that the guaranty contrary to argument is unambiguous. 
It is clear and unambiguous and that Christian's argument that he 
was effectively discharged fails. 
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Tr., p. 54, 1. 4 - p. 57,1. 15. At no point did the Court indicate specifically what it thought the 
meaning of "owes or will owe" must be in order to make the Agreement unambiguous. 
IV. Issues Presented on Appeal. 
1. Did the District COUli err in concluding that the Guaranty 
Agreement drafted by ITB was unambiguous? 
2. Did the District Court err in concluding as a matter of law that the 
definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness" under the Guaranty Agreement drafted by ITB was 
unambiguously unconditional? 
3. Did the District COUli err by construing an ambiguous guaranty 
agreement in favor of the lender which drafted it and against the guarantor? 
4. Did the District Court err in failing to conclude that ITB's 
disposition of its collateral by other than statutory nonjudicial foreclosure left no amount "owed" 
by ITB's borrower, such that no "Indebtedness" remained for Clu'istian to guaranty? 
5. Did the District Court err in granting ITB's motion for partial 
summary judgment and denying Christian's motion for summary judgment? 
V. Argument. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Court reviews a motion for summary judgment using the same standard 
employed by the district court in deciding the motion. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 149 
Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable 
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persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. 
Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No.2. 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996). 
The Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 
P.3d 525,528 (2003). Whether a contract term is ambiguous is an issue oflaw. Cannon v. Perry, 
144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007). "A contract term is ambiguous when there are 
two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical," i.e., it contains 
absurdities or contradictions, Potlatch Educ. Ass'n & Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 
Idaho 630, 633 (2010); Swanson v. Beco Construction Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63 (2008), or where 
the parties' intent "cannot be determined clearly from the language of the contract". George v. 
Univ. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 37 (1991). Words in a contract are to be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning, Swanson v. Beco Construction Co., supra; Roeder Mining Inc. v. Johnson, 
118 Idaho 96, 97 (1990). 
B. Standards applicable to guaranty agreements. 
"A guarantor, like a surety, has been held to be a favorite of the law and his 
liability is not to be extended by implication beyond the express limits or terms of the 
instrument, or its plain intent." Industrial Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 233 (1979). 
"Guaranty instruments are strictly construed. A guarantor's obligations are limited 
to those expressly recited in the guaranty instrument." CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV 
Ctr., 118 Idaho 185,191 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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Similar to the rule regarding insurance policies, the burden is on the lender to use 
clear and precise language if it wishes to expand the scope of the guaranty. See Arreguin v. 
Farmers Insurance Co., 145, Idaho 459, 461 (2008). Thus, if the Court engages in interpretation 
of a guaranty agreement because it is ambiguous, "it must be interpreted in favor of the 
guarantor." The Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553 (2007). 
c. The long-established plain meaning of 
"owes" is to be subject to a binding 
obligation to pay, and the Guaranty 
Agreement provides no other meaning in 
the definition of the guaranteed 
"Indebtedness" . 
The "Indebtedness" which is the subject of the guaranty is expressly defined in 
the Guaranty Agreement as those amounts that the borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB. ITB 
resolutely refused during proceedings below to directly address the plain meaning of the word 
"owes."J The District Comi likewise ignored the issue, focusing instead on parts of the Guaranty 
Agreement other than the primary definition of the guaranty obligation, i.e., the "Indebtedness." 
However, over the years several authorities have held in a variety of contexts that the word 
"owes" plainly (in other words, unambiguously) means "subject to an enforceable obligation to 
pay." 
Indeed, throughout its briefing below ITB asserted variously (without reference to the actual language of 
the Guaranty Agreement) that Christian guarantied or is obligated for "the loan", "all debt incurred by Trinity but 
not paid by Trinity", "any obligation/debt incurred by the borrower", "all of borrower's indebtedness under the 
promissory note", "all amounts that Trinity incurred", and, vaguely, "the balance". CR 245,248,251,258. ITB 
apparently wished the guaranty obligation to be anything but what is actually defined in the Guaranty Agreement to 
be - the "Indebtedness," i.e., amounts the borrower "owes or will owe Lender." 
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Black's Law Dictionary, (5th Ed. 1979) at 996, defines "owe" as follows: "To 
be bound to do or omit something, especially to pay a debt.,,2 In other words, if a debtor is no 
longer bound or obligated to pay a debt (as where a creditor has lost the ability to enforce an 
instrument), the debt is no longer "effective" or "outstanding" and the debtor no longer "owes" 
the creditor anything. 
A case similar to this one is Salitan v. Magnus, 62 N.J. Super. 323, 162 A.2d 883 
(N.J. Super., App. Div. 1960). There, the defendants guaranteed all obligations which the 
borrower "may at any time owe" to the plaintiff. The borrower filed for bankruptcy protection, 
and the amounts owed to the plaintiff as of the time of the bankruptcy filing were eventually paid 
through the liquidation of the borrower's assets. However, the plaintiff sought to collect from 
the defendant guarantor the interest that would have accrued on the debt from the date of the 
bankruptcy filing forward. Rejecting this claim, the court stated that "although defendants' 
liability on the contract of guaranty is direct and unconditional in the sense that it was 
enforceable by plaintiffs without the necessity of first obtaining a judgment against the 
[borrower], their obligation is not independent." This was so because the guarantor defendants 
"guaranteed the payment only of such debts as the [borrower] might at any time 'owe' to 
plaintiffs." 162 A.2d at 889. Thus, the court concluded, "[t]here can be no doubt that, in the 
circumstances of this case, the existence of a subsisting corporate debt to plaintiffs is essential to 
See also http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/owe ("to be under obligation to payor repay in 
return for something received"); http://dictionary.reference.comibrowse/owe 
("to be under obligation to payor repay"). Likewise, Black's defines "outstanding" as "constituting an effective 
obligation." Black's Law Dictionary, supra. 
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a suit on the guaranty." Id. Because the borrower was held in its bankruptcy case not to be 
obligated to the plaintiff for post-petition interest, the court concluded, "we hold that plaintiffs 
have proved no subsisting corporate liability to them and hence no right to recover under the 
guaranty." Id. at 891. 
The decision in Salitan was relied upon to dispose of the same issue by the Texas 
Court of Appeals in Western Bank v. Carline, 757 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. Ap. 1988). There, the 
cOUli concluded that it was reasonable to interpret the guaranty agreement not to obligate the 
guarantors to pay post-petition interest and fees "because those sums can never be charged 
against the principal, Tex-La," since the guarantors only "bound themselves to pay 'any and all 
indebtedness ... which Tex-La . .. may now or may at any time hereafter owe ... '" 757 S.W.2d 
at 114. 
Another similar case is Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (Ct. 
App. 2005). There, the personal guaranty agreement provided that it covered "the indebtedness 
evidenced by a celiain promissory note" in the amount of $95,000, but then stated that the 
"indebtedness includes all indebtedness and all obligations owing now or in the future of 
Creditor by Debtor[.]" The lender attempted to enforce the personal guaranty with respect to a 
debt of the borrower unrelated to the original $95,000 note. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
rejected the lender's argument that the second clause expanded the initial definition of what was 
guaranteed, and concluded that the second clause "irreconcilably conflicts" with the first 
definition of the guaranteed amount. As a result, the court reasoned, the "defendant's clearly 
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expressed or manifested intent to guarantee any future loans is absent because of the ambiguity 
in the language of the Guaranty." Because the guarantor could not be liable beyond the express 
terms of the guaranty agreement, and such liability "cannot be implied from language that fails to 
clearly manifest an intention to assume another's debt," the court concluded that it was 
unnecessary to resolve the ambiguity and the guaranty was unenforceable as a matter of law. 
Courts have consistently interpreted the word "owes" in other contexts as well. In 
Cohen v. Disner, 36 Cal. App. 4th 855, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), the court 
construed a section of the California Civil Code dealing with dishonored checks and imposing 
liability for "the amount owing upon" the dishonored instrument. The court concluded that 
"[t]he plain meaning of 'to owe' is 'to be under obligation to payor repay in return for 
something received.'" 42 Cal. Rptr.2d at 785 (quoting Websters' New Int'l Diet. (3d ed. 1976), 
p. 1612). The court then stated: "By acknowledging there must be an enforceable obligation to 
pay, section 1719 echoes the UCC, which precludes recovery where the payee has 'no right to 
enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument.' ... If the maker has no enforceable 
obligation to pay a dishonored check, there is no amount 'owing upon that check' under the plain 
language of section 1719. . . Had the Legislature intended section 1719 to be a strict liability 
statute, it would have imposed liability for 'the amount written upon that check' rather than 'the 
amount owing upon that check.'" Id. at 785-6. 
Similarly, in In re Leggett, 335 B.R. 227 (N.D. Ga. 2005), a creditor sought a 
ruling that a debtor was ineligible for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because his debts were too great. 
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The Court reviewed the language of 11 U.S .C. § 1 09( e), which provides in pertinent part that 
"[ 0 ]nly an individual debtor with regular income that owes" certain "debts" below a certain 
amount may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court began by 
observing that eligibility for Chapter 13 "thus depends on the amount of debts that the debtor 
owes on the date of filing the petition." 335 B.R. at 230. The Court continued: "The 
Bankruptcy Code expressly defines 'debt' as 'liability on a claim,' ... and the plain meaning of 
'owe' is 'to be under an obligation to pay.'" Id. (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Diet. 1612 
(Merriam-Webster 1993)). It concluded: "The Debtor's eligibility in this case, therefore, 
depends on whether the Debtor owed [the creditor] a debt on the filing date, that is, whether he 
was liable on [the creditor's] claim. Id. 
In Harrison v. Mason, 191 So. 916 (Ala. 1939), the issue was whether the 
defendant had provided to the plaintiff a written reaffirmation of a debt sufficient to constitute a 
new promise re-struiing the limitations. There, the court stated: "The word 'owes' is used in the 
written acknowledgement here in question," and then concluded from a review of other 
authorities that "the word 'owes' is defined as meaning 'obligated or bound to pay.'" 191 So. at 
919. In one decision cited by the cOUli in Harrison, the court stated: "To say that one owes a 
debt means simply that he is obliged or bound to pay, and that may be said as well of an 
immature as of an overdue obligation." McDuffie v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 59 So. 567, 568 (Ala. 
1912). See also Miller v. Jones, 137 Neb. 605, 609, 290 N.W. 467 (1940) (quoting McDuffie 
with approval). 
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In Baietto v. Baietto, 319 Ill. App. 8; 48 N.E.2d 726 (1943), where the issue was 
whether a writing by a deceased father, using the word "owe," was sufficient to support his sons' 
claim against his estate for work they performed, the court stated: "The word 'owe,' as used by 
the father also has a definite meaning. Worcester's Comprehensive Dictionary describes it as 'to 
be bound to pay, or to pay to or to be indebted to.' Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines' 
'owe,' 'to have an obligation by someone, on account of something done, or received; to be 
indebted to, as to owe the grocer for supplies or a laborer for services. ", 48 N.E.2d at 728. 
Most recently, in the context of insurance, a court applying the term "justly 
owing" in a statute related to proofs of claim" stated: "We interpret 'justly owing' to mean the 
amount Midland would have been obligated to pay its Major Policyholder had it remained 
solvent." Matter of Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 16 N.y'3d 536; 947 N.E.2d 1174 (Ct. App. 
N.Y. 2011). 
Thus, courts have long and consistently held that the word "owes" plainly means 
subject to an enforceable obligation to pay. Christian's interpretation of the term, and of the 
definition of the term "Indebtedness" in the Guaranty Agreement, is entirely reasonable. Even if 
the other terms relied upon by ITB and the District Court can be interpreted to provide for an 
unconditional guaranty obligation, the plain meaning of the term "owes or will owe" necessarily 
renders the Agreement ambiguous. 
The fact that guarantor's liability is limited is expressly recognized in the second 
paragraph of the section of the Guaranty Agreement entitled "INDEBTEDNESS". The first 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT -17 
sentence of this paragraph refers to the definition of "Indebtedness" as a "limitation on 
liability.,,3 Limiting the guarantor's liability to what the borrower is legally obligated to pay to 
the lender is consistent with the express reference to the definition of "Indebtedness" as a 
"limitation on liability." Although the guarantor's obligation to pay the "Indebtedness" is 
unlimited (as to amount), the Guarantor's liability is limited to the "Indebtedness", i.e. what the 
borrower "owes" (is legally obligated to pay). 
ITB easily could have drafted the Guaranty Agreement to provide that what is 
guaranteed is the remaining balance of the Note, irrespective of whether Trinity still "owes" that 
amount.4 Instead, ITB chose to include the limitation that Defendant guaranteed only what the 
borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB. Because ITB disposed of the collateral by obtaining the 
appointment of a receiver for that purpose, instead of foreclosing on the Deed of Trust, it has no 
right to obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity and there is no remaining amount that 
Trinity "owes" to ITB.5 
The limitation on the guarantor's liability that appears above this sentence is the limitation of 
"Indebtedness" to the amounts that the bon·ower "owes or will owe Lender". 
4 While the Guaranty Agreement authorizes ITB to "alter, compromise, renew, extend, accelerate or 
otherwise change one or more times the time for payment or other terms of the Indebtedness" without lessening 
liability under the guaranty, it pointedly does not expressly authorize ITB to take an act which discharges the 
borrower offurther obligation under the Note and yet maintain the guaranty liability. CR 14. The Agreement does 
not anywhere clearly state that, rather than being limited to the amount Trinity "owes" (remains legally obligated to 
pay), the guaranty obligation extends to amounts from which Trinity has been discharged or relieved by ITB's own 
action. 
See also First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Scherle, 356 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1984), where 
the court held that the lender, having made a full credit bid for the collateral at the sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of 
a mortgage granted by the borrower, could not pursue related personal guarantees. 
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D. The District Court's reliance on other 
terms in the Guaranty Agreement to 
provide for an unconditional guaranty 
obligation directly conflict with the plain 
meaning of "owes," creating ambiguity. 
The District Court read the first and second sentence of the section in the 
Guaranty Agreement entitled "INDEBTEDNESS" as providing, in essence, as follows: 
"Indebtedness" means all amounts Borrower owes or will 
owe Lender. "Indebtedness" includes amounts incurred by 
BOlTower that are barred or unenforceable against 
Borrower for any reason whatsoever. 
This interpretation creates a contradiction with the plain meaning of the first 
sentence which contains the primary definition of the guaranty. In this situation courts have 
rejected the secondary conflicting definition. See Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 1227 eCt. App. 2005). In Seymour the Court rejected the secondary conflicting 
definition, reasoning that the resulting contradiction made it impossible to conclude that the 
guarantor intended to guarantee the additional amount claimed to be included in the secondary 
conflicting definition. The same result should be reached here. 
The phrase relied upon by ITB and the District Court is not included in the initial 
definition of "Indebtedness," but in a following sentence listing examples of items which may 
constitute an "Indebtedness." At best, this language is in irreconcilable conflict with the express 
limitation in the primary definition of "Indebtedness" to amounts the borrower "owes or will 
owe" to ITB. It is impossible to simultaneously define "Indebtedness" as limited to the amount 
the borrower "owes", i.e., is legally obligated to pay, and also to include an amount which the 
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borrower is not legally obligated to pay, i.e., amounts "barred or unenforceable ... for any 
reason whatsoever," particularly where the discharge of Trinity's obligation resulted from ITB' s 
own choice to dispose of the collateral in a manner which foreclosed it from further enforcing the 
Note against Trinity. These terms cannot reasonably be harmonized in a fashion favorable to 
ITB, rendering the Guaranty at least ambiguous. "A contract term is ambiguous when there are 
two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical." Potlatch Educ. Ass'n & 
Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 633 (2010); see also Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 806 (Ct. App. 2000) (contract is ambiguous if its terms are "contradictory to and 
inconsistent with" each other); Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Johnson, 118 Idaho 96, 97 (1990) 
(contract is ambiguous if it "contains absurdities or contradictions,,).6 Words in a contract are to 
be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63 
(2008). 7 In addition, a contract should not be construed in manner which renders one of its terms 
a nullity. Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n v. Aune, 124 Idaho 132, 137 (1993). Reliance on the 
terms resorted to by ITB and the District Court requires reading the plain term "owes or will 
owe" out of the Agreement, an improper result. However, the District Court's comments make 
clear this is exactly what it did. This was error. Because the plain meaning of "owes or will 
owe" defining "Indebtedness at worst directly conflicts with the examples of items of 
6 Moreover, "[a]n agreement that is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties cannot be 
ascertained is unenforceable, and courts are left with no choice but to leave the parties as they found them." Griffith 
v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 737 (2007). Particularly in the case of a lender-drafted guamnty 
agreement which is subject to strict construction, it is not the court's role to clarifY uncertainty once found, but the 
court must construe it against the lender and drafter. The Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, supra. 
The Guaranty Agreement contains no expression of any intent to give "owes or will owe" a technical 
meaning at odds with its widely acknowledged plain meaning. Indeed, in the context of a financial instrument, it is 
difficult to see how "owes or will owe" could ever be read otherwise. 
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"Indebtedness" in the next sentence of the Agreement, the District Court should have found that 
the Agreement is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the guarantor. The Vanderford 
Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553 (2007). 
The second sentence can be construed in such a way that it does not contradict the 
primary definition of "Indebtedness" contained in the first sentence. It appears that this second 
sentence addresses the situation where an amount that is owed by the Borrower initially later 
becomes barred or unenforceable, and then is revived by a subsequent judgment or agreement. 
The second sentence provides that a revived substituted debt is guaranteed even though the initial 
debt may have been barred or unenforceable. The second sentence provides, in essence, that: 
"Indebtedness" includes any present or future judgments against Borrower, future 
advances, loans or transactions that renew, extend, modify, refinance, consolidate 
or substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether [these debts, 
liabilities and obligations that are renewed, extended, modified, refinanced, 
consolidated, or substituted, are] barred or unenforceable against BOlTower for 
any reason whatsoever. 
This is a more reasonable interpretation because the clause that is modified appears in closer 
proximity to the modifying phrase than that suggested by the Court and because it harmonizes 
with, and doesn't conflict with, the plain meaning of "owes." If the second sentence admits of 
two reasonable interpretations it is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous it must be interpreted in favor 
of the guarantor. The District Court erred in interpreting this ambiguous provision in favor of 
the ITB. 
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The District Court stated the principle that the Guaranty Agreement's language 
must be read in its entirety and effect given to all terms if possible, and the Court then concluded 
that Defendant's reliance on the plain meaning of the term "owes or will owe" worked to nullify 
other portions of the Agreement. As discussed above, this is not necessarily the case. Equally 
importantly, however, the Court's reliance on other parts of the Agreement in a manner which 
effectively deletes the term "owes or will owe" from the definition of the guaranty liability, and 
renders unlimited a guaranty liability which is expressly stated to be limited, violates the very 
same principle. As a result, the Agreement is necessarily ambiguous and must be construed in 
favor of the guarantor. 
E. Various other parts of the Guaranty 
Agreement relied upon by the District 
Court are irrelevant, as they depend on 
the present existence of an 
"Indebtedness" and do not change the 
defined scope of the guaranty obligation. 
The District Court relied heavily on other portions of the Guaranty Agreement, to 
the exclusion of the primary definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness," to determine that the 
guaranty obligation unambiguously includes the balance of the Note, even though no longer 
"owed" by Trinity. CR 14-15. However, those other terms depend on the present existence of 
an "Indebtedness," i.e., an amount the borrower presently "owes" and remains legally obligated 
to pay. If no "Indebtedness" exists, they are irrelevant: 
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1. The provision that the Guaranty Agreement "will continue in full force 
until all the Indebtedness ... shall have been fully and finally paid and satisfied" is irrelevant 
where no Indebtedness exists to be paid. 
2. The waiver of the right to require the Lender "to resort for payment or 
proceed directly or at once against any other person, including Borrower" or to "pursue any other 
remedy within Lender's power" is irrelevant where there is no remaining Indebtedness to be 
guaranteed, because at that point no need exists for the guarantor to assert any such right. 
3. The District Court concluded that the second paragraph in the section of 
the Agreement entitled "Guarantor's Waivers" precludes the interpretation that the guarantor's 
liability (i.e. the "Indebtedness") is limited to the amount that the borrower is legally obligated to 
pay. That paragraph provides that: 
Guarantor also waives any and all rights or defenses based 
on suretyship or impairment of collateral including, but not 
limited to, any rights or defenses arising by reason of (A) 
any "one action" or "anti deficiency" law "one action" or 
"anti deficiency" law or any other law which may prevent 
Lender from bringing any action, including a claim for 
deficiency, against Guarantor before or after Lenders 
commencement or completion of any foreclosure action, 
either judicially or by exercise of a power of sale[.] 
The waiver of "defenses based on suretyship or impairment of collateral" is irrelevant where no 
Indebtedness remains to be guaranteed, because at that point no need exists for the guarantor to 
assert any such defenses. The District Court apparently concluded that reliance on the limited 
guaranty obligation defined in the Agreement (i.e. the amount that the borrower "owes or will 
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owe" to ITB) is a right or defense "based on" or "arising by reason of' Idaho's one action or 
anti-deficiency statute. In fact, the limitation of the guarantor's liability is a right that arises by 
reason of the Agreement's definition of that liability. It does not arise by reason of the anti-
deficiency or single action statute; although the application of the statute may create the 
circumstance that permits exercise of the right. The Agreement's definition of the guarantor's 
liability creates a right in the guarantor to be free of liability that is beyond the defined limit. 
The waiver section of the Agreement does not purport to waive the limitation of the guaranty 
liability that is defined in the first and second sections ofthe Agreement.8 
4. The provision authorizing the Lender to "enforce this Guaranty even when 
Lender has not exhausted Lender's remedies against anyone else obligated to pay the 
Indebtedness or against any collateral securing the Indebtedness" is irrelevant where no 
Indebtedness remains to be guaranteed. 
5. The District Court also apparently reasoned that the amounts the borrower 
"owes or will owe" to ITB includes amounts not owed by the borrower, based on the statement 
in the first sentence of the Guaranty Agreement that the guaranty is absolute and unconditional. 
In fact, the first sentence states only that the guarantor absolutely and unconditionally guaranties 
payment of the "Indebtedness." The language the Court relied upon is relevant only if there 
Of course, if the waiver provisions are interpreted as a waiver of a right created in another section of the Agreement an 
obvious ambiguity is created - which must be construed against the Bank and not the Guarantor. 
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remains "Indebtedness," as it is defined. It does not state that the Guarantor absolutely and 
unconditionally guaranties payment of all amounts loaned.9 
6. The Court relied on the following provision in the Guaranty Agreement to 
conclude that the guaranty liability extends to loan amounts that are not owed by the Borrower: 
If payment is made ... on the Indebtedness and thereafter 
Lender is forced to remit the amount of that payment to 
Borrower's trustee in bankruptcy ... the Indebtedness shall 
be considered unpaid for the purpose of the enforcement of 
their Guaranty. 
This provision appears in the section entitled "Guarantors Waivers." It is not part of the section 
which defines the guaranteed "Indebtedness." Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the 
interpretation that the guaranty liability is limited to the amounts that the borrower is legally 
obligated to pay to ITB. It acknowledges the defined term "Indebtedness" and simply states that 
the amount that the Borrower is legally obligated to pay is not reduced by a payment that is 
diverted to a trustee in bankruptcy. The significance of this provision is the parties' agreement 
that the Lender's claim in bankruptcy should not be reduced by a payment that turns out to be a 
preference under the bankruptcy law and confiscated by the trustee. It does not state that the 
'Indebtedness" of the borrower, and thus the guarantor's liability, would not be affected by the 
discharge of the borrower in bankruptcy. To the extent it can be interpreted otherwise, it directly 
conflicts with the plain definition of "Indebtedness," creating an ambiguity. 
9 The Court also relied in its comments from the bench on the presumed broad "purpose of a guaranty." This is not the 
guiding principle for interpreting a guaranty. If anything the rule that guaranties must be construed strictly in favor of the 
guarantor indicates that guaranties are to be read narrowly, not broadly. 
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Thus, contrary to the District Court's asseliion, Christian did not ignore most of 
the language of the Guaranty Agreement. Rather, the language relied upon by ITB and the 
District Court is irrelevant, and either does not affect the expressly defined scope of the guaranty 
obligation or can only reasonably harmonized in a manner which does not expand the scope of 
the obligation beyond its plain meaning. If it cannot be harmonized, it renders the Agreement 
unambiguous. 
F. Because ITB chose to dispose of its collateral by 
receivership rather than through a nonjudicial 
foreclosure, it cannot obtain a deficiency 
judgment against its borrower, Trinity, and the 
borrower has no further enforceable obligation 
to ITB. 
Idaho's deed of trust deficiency statute states, in pertinent part: 
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust, 
as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be sought for the 
balance due upon the obligation for which such deed of trust was 
given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in 
his complaint the entire amount of indebtedness which was secured 
by such deed of trust and the amount for which the same was sold 
and the fair market value at the date of sale, together with interest 
from such date of sale, costs of sale and attorney's fees. 
Idaho Code § 45-1512. Additionally, I.C. § 45-1503(1) provides in pertinent part: 
If any obligation secured by a trust deed is breached, the 
beneficiary may not institute a judicial action against the grantor or 
his successor in interest to enforce an obligation owed by the 
grantor or his successor in interest unless: 
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(a) The trust deed has been foreclosed by advertisement and sale 
in the manner provided in this chapter and the judicial action is 
brought pursuant to section 45-1512, Idaho Code; or 
(b) The action is one for foreclosure as provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property; or 
(c) The beneficiary's interest in the property covered by the trust 
deed is substantially valueless as defined in subsection (2) of this 
section lO, in which case the beneficiary may bring an action against 
the grantor or his successor in interest to enforce the obligation 
owed by grantor or his successor in interest without first resorting 
to the security; or 
(d) The action is one excluded from the meaning of "action" 
under the provisions of section 6-101 (3), Idaho Code." 
Thus, a deficiency judgment may be obtained by a creditor against a borrower 
under a promissory note secured by a deed of trust only after foreclosure and sale of real 
property pursuant to the deed of trust. First Interstate Bank v. Eisenbarth, 123 Idaho 895, 898 
(Ct. App. 1993) ("[U]nder I.C. § 45-1503 ... no action can be maintained for the recovery on a 
promissory note secured by a deed of trust, unless the action is coupled with an action to 
foreclose the deed of trust, except where it is shown that the security has become substantially 
valueless."). A creditor holding a deed of trust and disposing of its collateral other than by 
foreclosure pursuant to the deed of trust cannot obtain a deficiency judgment against its debtor. 
10 That the creditor may not dispose of the collateral outside of a foreclosure and then pursue action on the 
balance of the note, using the argument that the collateral has been rendered "substantially valueless," is made clear 
by I.e. § 45-1503(2), which provides that '''substantially valueless' means that the beneficiary's interest in the 
propelty covered by the trust deed has become valueless through no fault of the beneficimy[.]" 
II I.e. § 6-101 (3) excludes various acts from the definition of an "action" for the purpose of the "one-action 
rule," but specifically does not exclude an action for "the collection of the debt or enforcement of the obligation or 
realization of the collateral securing the debt or other obligation." I.e. § 6-101(3)(m). 
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Id. As a consequence, the promissory note secured by the deed of trust has no more "binding 
force" and the borrower's remaining obligation is effectively discharged. 
Here, ITB chose not to foreclose on the Deed of Trust, instead seeking the 
appointment of a receiver for the specific purpose of marketing and selling the collateral. 
Therefore, its borrower Trinity is no longer obligated to it. I.C. §45-1503(l); First Interstate 
Bank v. Eisenbarth, supra. ITB admitted this fact its briefing below. See Plaintiff's Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10 (admitting that "Plaintiff can no longer 
seek collection of that money because of the provision of the anti-deficiency statute that limit 
[sic] a borrower's liability"); see also Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 9 ("The creditor has chosen not 
to enforce its rights for recovery against the borrower and/or collateral in such a way that the 
creditor has no more legal rights against the borrower ... " ); CR 251, 252. 12 
ITB argued below that Christian as a guarantor "cannot seek protection under the 
Anti-Deficiency Statute." The District Court appears to have relied in part on that argument. 
Christian does not seek any such "protection," but the application of Idaho Code § 45-1503 and 
§45-1512 does impact whether the borrower, Trinity, "owes" any remaining amount to ITB, and 
thus whether there remains any "Indebtedness" for Christian to guaranty. This is a direct result 
ofITB's own definition of the scope of the guaranty, the "Indebtedness." None of the decisions 
cited by ITB to the District COUli contain any indication that the guaranty agreement at issue 
12 While admitting that it had "no more legal rights" against Trinity because it could no longer obtain a 
deficiency judgment against Trinity, ITB simultaneously asserted to the District Court that "Trinity owes money to 
Plaintiff, but Plaintiff can no longer seek collection of that money because of the provision of the anti-deficiency 
statute that limits [sic] a borrower's liability[.]" CR 251,252. In other words, ITB claimed that the borrower "owes 
money to [it]," while simultaneously having no "liability" to it. 
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defined the guarantor's obligation as limited to an "Indebtedness" defined to mean only those 
amounts the borrower "owes." They are ilTelevant to this case. 
In the decision ITB relied primarily on, First Sec. Bank ond. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 
172 (1988), the court rejected the guarantor's argument that direct recourse to the anti-
deficiency laws should be extended to guarantors on public policy grounds. The same issue is 
not implicated in this case. Defendant does not seek direct recourse to the anti-deficiency 
defense. The statutes are relevant only insofar as they caused the borrower's liability to ITB to 
be extinguished as a result of its choice in disposing of the collateral, and the Guaranty 
Agreement expressly limits the guaranty obligation to those amounts which the borrower still 
"owes or will owe" to ITB i.e., those amounts for which it remains liable to ITB. Gaige and 
cases like it would be relevant only if ITB had drafted the Guaranty Agreement to define the 
guaranty obligation in terms of amounts borrowed, rather than amounts still owed. 13 
G. Attorney's Fees. 
Christian is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
The "gravamen of the dispute," the commercial guaranty upon which ITB sought to recover, is a 
commercial transaction within the meaning of the statute. Bingham v. Montane Resource 
Associates, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (Idaho 1999). 
13 For the same reasons, decisions dealing with the "single-action rule" also are beside the point. Christian is 
not arguing that ITB cannot collect on the guaranty without first foreclosing on the collateral because he is entitled 
to the direct benefit of the statutes; rather, because his guaranty liability is expressly limited to amounts the borrower 
still "owes or will owe" to ITB, ITB's decision not to foreclose on the collateral eliminated any further liability of 
the borrower to ITB, thereby leaving no amounts the borrower "owes or will owe" for Christian to guarantee. 
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VI. Conclusion. 
The District Court's ruling is based on its detelmination the Guaranty Agreement 
IS unambiguous and provides for Christian to guarantee the total unpaid loan balance even 
though, as a result of ITB's own conduct, there remains no amount the borrower "owes or will 
owe." The Court's construction of the Guaranty Agreement: 
a. Is contrary to the plain language of the instrument; 
b. Extends the guaranty obligation by implication beyond its express limits; and 
c. Is premised on ambiguous provisions of the instrument that the District Court 
improperly construed in favor of the lender which drafted the Guaranty Agreement. 
The District Comi's decision granting ITB's motion for partial summary judgment and denying 
Christian's motion for summary judgment should be reversed and remanded with direction to 
enter summary judgment for Christian. 
Dated this 2~ day of August, 2012. 
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN, HARDEE & DAVIES, LLP 
By D~l\~\N\OS\~ 
Barry Marc 
Attorneys for Defendant! Appellant 
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